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Over the past decade Daubert has transformed judicial decisions
involving questions of science and law. Daubert governs the federal
2
courts and the 30 states that adopted Daubert in whole or in part.
∗
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excellent conference and Professors Ronald J. Allen and Paul C. Giannelli for their
provocative and insightful comments.
1
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2
See Alabama—S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 516-17
(Ala. 2000) (acknowledging that the legislature has used Daubert with respect to DNA
evidence, but not explicitly switching standard from Frye to Daubert for other
evidence); Alaska—State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 388-99 (Alaska 1999) (adopting the
Daubert standard); Arizona—Logerquist v. McVey, No. CV-98-0587-PR, 2000 WL
419980 (Ariz. Apr. 19, 2000) (en banc) (retaining the Frye standard); Arkansas—
Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 293-94 (Ark. 1996) (recognizing the Daubert standard
but not expressly adopting it); California—People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323-24
(Cal. 1994) (refusing to adopt Daubert and noting that California has long held to the
Frye standard and would continue to do so); Colorado—Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d
1105, 1113 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (noting that Colorado "has neither explicitly
endorsed nor rejected the Daubert analysis"); Connecticut—State v. Porter, 698 A.2d
739, 751 (Conn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert standard); Delaware—Bell Sports, Inc.
v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582 (Del. 2000) (expressly adopting Daubert); Florida—Brim v.
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997) (rejecting Daubert); Georgia—Jordan v. Ga.
Power Co., 466 S.E.2d 601, 604-05 (Ga. 1995) (applying state law and not adopting
Daubert); Hawaii—State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 42 (Haw. 1997) (refusing to follow
Daubert); Idaho—State v. Trevino, 980 P.2d 552, 557-58 (Idaho 1999) (adopting the
Daubert standard); Indiana—Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 462
(Ind. 2001) (retaining the Frye standard); Iowa—Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 530-33 (Iowa 1999) (adopting a limited application of Daubert);
Kansas—State v. Canaan, 964 P.2d 681, 691-92, 694 (Kan. 1998) (retaining the Frye
standard); Kentucky—Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995)
(Daubert expressly adopted); Louisiana—State v. Ledet, 792 So. 2d 160 (La. 2001)
(adopting the Daubert standard); Maine—State v. McDonald, 718 A.2d 195 (Me.
1998) (adopting Daubert); Maryland—Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1295-96 n.10
(Md. 1995) (determining that Maryland will still follow the Frye standard despite the
fact that Maryland's Rules of Evidence are patterned after the Federal Rules of
Evidence and were passed into legislation after the Daubert decision);
Massachusetts—Commonwealth v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 2001) (applying
various Daubert factors); Michigan—Although the Michigan Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue, the consensus among the lower courts favors Frye. See, e.g.
People v. Coy, No. 238112, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 1880, at *12 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App.
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Even in states that retain a Frye-type “general acceptance” standard,
most state judges report that Daubert exerts a powerful influence on
4
their admissibility decisions. Since Daubert, judges must decide for

Aug. 7, 2003) (stating that until the Michigan Supreme Court holds otherwise, the
lower courts are bound to apply Frye). The Michigan legislature, however, has
codified Daubert for expert scientific opinion in actions for “death of a person or for
injury to a person or property . . . .” See MICH. STAT. ANN. 600.2955 (Michie 2003);
Minnesota—State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 585 & n.3 (Minn. 1994) (noting that
the Frye standard has been utilized before and after Daubert although expressing that
"we do not address the effect of the Daubert decision on the use or application of the
Frye rule in Minnesota"); Mississippi—Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Miss.
1998) (retaining the Frye standard); Missouri—Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp.,
863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) (continuing to apply Frye); Montana—State v. Moore, 885
P.2d 457 (Mont. 1994) (adopting the Daubert standard); Nebraska—Sheridan v.
Catering Mgmt., Inc., 566 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Neb. 1997) (retaining the Frye standard);
Nevada—Krause Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 556, 569 (Nev. 2001) (reiterating an earlier
rejection of Daubert); New Hampshire—State v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260 (N.H. 2000)
(applying various Daubert factors); New Jersey—State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621
(N.J. 1997) (applying various Daubert factors); New Mexico—State v. Anderson, 881
P.2d 29 (N.M. 1994) (adopting the Daubert standard); New York—People v. Wernick,
674 N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) (retaining the Frye standard); North Carolina—State
v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639, 641 (N.C. 1995) (adopting the Daubert standard);
North Dakota—City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 705 n.2 (N.D. 1994)
(retaining the Frye standard); Ohio—Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735
(Ohio 1998) (adopting Daubert factors); Oklahoma—Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591
(Okla. 2003) (expressly adopting Daubert/Kumho for civil matters and noting that the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has already done the same for criminal
matters); Pennsylvania—Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 & n.10 (Pa.
1999) (retaining the Frye standard); Rhode Island—State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d
879, 884 n.2 (R.I. 1996) (adopting the Daubert standard); South Carolina - State v.
Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (S.C. 1998) (using factors similar to, but not specifically
adopting, the Daubert factors); South Dakota—State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482 (S.D.
1994) (adopting the Daubert standard); Tennessee—McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert standard); Texas—E.I. du Pont
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995) (adopting the Daubert
standard); Utah—State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2001) (stating that the test
for admissibility requires threshold showing of “inherent reliability”); Vermont—
State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226 (Vt. 1993) (adopting the Daubert decision); Virginia –
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990) (expressly declining to
follow Frye, but not adopting Daubert); Washington—State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d
1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996) (retaining the Frye standard); West Virginia—Wilt v.
Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the Daubert decision); Wisconsin—
State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1995) (basing admissibility on three-part
relevance test); Wyoming—Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 1999) (adopting
the Daubert standard). The District of Columbia has not yet adopted Federal Rule of
Evidence 702, and there has been no majority opinion that has addressed Daubert. Cf.
Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 651-52 (D.C. 1995) (Newman, S.J., dissenting)
(urging the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert).
3
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4
See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 443
(2001) (describing how 94% of state court judges surveyed find Daubert has either
“some value” or “a great deal of value” for their decision-making process on
questions involving scientific evidence regardless of whether Daubert or Frye governs
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themselves whether proffered evidence is scientifically reliable; they
5
may no longer defer to the scientific community. Daubert, the
Supreme Court’s response to growing concerns that jurors were using
6
“junk science” to decide legal cases, contains the implicit assumption
that forcing judges into uncharted terrain is better than exposing
7
jurors to evidence they could never hope to understand.
8
In 1998, the Kumho Court expanded the requirement of
autonomous judicial validity screening beyond scientific evidence to
include technology-based evidence and a potentially infinite
9
undefined class of evidence that relates to “specialized knowledge.”
Although Justice Breyer did not explicitly ground his analysis of the
plaintiff’s tire engineering evidence in the four Daubert scientific
reliability criteria, i.e., (1) testability/falsifiability; (2) error rates; (3)
10
peer review and publication; and (4) general acceptance, he
emphasized that similar factors should govern the evaluation of
11
technical or specialized evidence. According to the Kumho Court,
admissibility in their jurisdiction).
5
Although the Daubert Court used the word “reliable” to refer to the quality of
the scientific evidence, I have argued elsewhere that this reflects a misunderstanding
of this scientific term of art and that “validity” is a more accurate term. See Joëlle
Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide
Science and Law With Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1065-70 (2001)
(describing how “reliability” refers only to the reproducibility of data, even if the data
are wrong, while “validity” connotes a connection between the theory or conclusions
and the empirical world).
6
See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991). There is an ongoing concern, a decade after Daubert, that
“jurors may also be influenced by scientific evidence that lacks validity . . . . If jurors
are unable to differentiate high-quality research from “junk” science, then it is likely
that their decisions will be influenced by both methodologically sound and
methodologically inferior research, which is clearly an undesirable outcome.” See
Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence Effects of Juror Gender and
Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 94 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 362 (1999).
7
“While meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under criticism for
donning white coats and making determinations that are outside their field of
expertise, the Supreme Court has obviously deemed this less objectionable than
dumping a barrage of questionable scientific evidence on a jury . . . .” Joseph
Sanders et al., Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y
& L. 139, 152 (2002).
8
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
9
See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141 (holding that the Daubert gate-keeping role “applies
not only to expert testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony
based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized knowledge’”). The Daubert decision had
been explicitly limited to scientific evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8 (“Our
discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the
expertise offered here.”).
10
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-97.
11
The Kumho Court makes a fairly bold assumption that criteria taken from (and
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“where such testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or
their application are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge
must determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the
12
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’”
Kumho
also added what may become a fifth criterion: “that an expert,
whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant
13
field.” Although Daubert and the post-Daubert cases clearly state that
14
these factors are neither fixed nor definitive, courts often operate
15
the admissibility standard by applying the factors in turn.
designed for) the assessment of “hard” empirical science can be useful for evaluating
all manner of specialized knowledge. This is where Daubert is least likely to fit its own
task at hand and where the doctrine has not yet been developed. In his contribution
to this Symposium, Professor Allen presages the conflict. “To ‘apply’ the standards
of Daubert to this vast and forbidding landscape, as Kumho Tire directs, seems to result
in a significant mismatch between tool and task. . . . [because] Daubert was fashioned
with normal science in mind and invokes standard criteria of scientific validation,
such as controlled studies and the like.” Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme
Court: What is the Problem?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2003).
12
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
13
Id. at 152.
14
In their contribution to this Symposium, Professors Mark P. Denbeaux and D.
Michael Risinger express concern that courts frequently overlook the fact that the
Daubert factors were intended to be flexible, despite the fact that the Kumho Court
“further emphasizes (by way of reiterating a part of Daubert often unfortunately
ignored) that the four factors were not each necessary conditions for a proper
reliability warrant, nor were other factors foreclosed.” Mark P. Denbeaux & D.
Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the
Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 32 (2003). Perhaps this concern will
become less pressing in the wake of Judge Pollak’s recent and widely-read decision in
United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Judge Pollak devoted
considerable time and attention to this very question, repeatedly mentioning the
“flexible” nature of the Daubert inquiry, id. at 562, and explicitly noting that Kumho
clarified that “Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively
applies to all experts in every case.” Id. at 562. Judge Pollak specifically links this
careful reading of Kumho to his decision to reconsider his earlier ruling, that
prosecution experts would not be permitted to present expert testimony that certain
fingerprints matched because the methodology of fingerprint analysis failed to satisfy
three of the four Daubert factors. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492
(E.D. Pa. 2002). Underlying the entire decision reexamining the fingerprint
evidence is Judge Pollak’s thorough consideration of the question of whether the
four Daubert factors are a “reasonable measure of the reliability of expert testimony.”
188 F. Supp. 2d at 563-75.
15
See, e.g., Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686-96 (8th Cir. 2001)
(providing a detailed analysis of each of the four Daubert factors in turn); see also
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 14, at 32 n.70 (“The four factors have too often
been leaden deadweights woodenly applied, inert impediments to the development
of a sophisticated approach by the courts to belief warrants for scientific evidence.”).
In response, Professors Denbaux and Risinger have developed an alternative inquiry
based on the following four components: “(1) [f]raming the case-specific target
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF A FACT-BASED VALIDITY STANDARD
Kumho did more than just expand the range of evidence subject
to more intensive and structured pretrial judicial scrutiny. I have
previously posited that Kumho contained a subtle correction of
16
Daubert perhaps intended to address five years of perceived judicial
17
reluctance to embrace the enhanced gate keeping role. Whatever
18
the Court’s motivation, Kumho refocused the admissibility decision
so that the fit/relevance prong of the two-part Daubert test became
more prominent. Justice Breyer emphasized that judges must assess
evidentiary reliability, not in some broad or abstract manner, but as
the evidence has been applied by this expert to the narrow “task at
19
hand.”
issue; (2) [f]raming the case-specific claim of expertise; (3) [d]etermining what
available information bears on a rational belief warrant in regard to the reliability of
the claimed expertise; [and] (4) [d]etermining the proper case-specific legal
standard of certainty for such a belief warrant.” Id. at 33.
16
The problem with Daubert might have been caused by the fact that the Court
placed the general reliability/validity step of the Daubert inquiry first. This structure
could appear to require that judges first determine whether proposed expert
testimony is generally considered “scientific knowledge,” before exploring its
relevance. Judges who read Daubert this way would balk at the requirement assumed
that they assess a potentially infinite amount of scientific information, most of which
would not be relevant to the facts at issue. See Moreno, supra note 5, at 1052-55.
17
This concern is addressed in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000
amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which state “[a] review of the case law
after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than
the rule.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also Erica Beecher-Monas,
Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55,
58 (1998) (“All too often, however, courts continue to evade the science issues. In
far too many jurisdictions, judges are turning a blind eye to the science involved in
the evidence before them.”); David L. Faigman, et al.., How Good is Good Enough?:
Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 665 (2000)
(“In the forensic context, courts have long admitted a surfeit of expertise with little
or no evaluation of the foundation upon which the opinion rests.”); Jay P. Kesan,
Who Knows Where the Time Goes?: A Critical Examination of the Post-Daubert Landscape,
52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 239-40 (1997) (reviewing numerous post-Daubert cases and
concluding that “the quantum of scientific information that must undergird an
expert’s methodology to render it scientifically valid and admissible under Daubert is
quite minimal”). However, a recent empirical study of a sample of federal district
court opinions published between 1980 and 1999 concluded that after Daubert, “
judges are more actively screening expert evidence[;] whether they are doing so in
ways that produce better outcomes has not been determined.” Lloyd Dixon & Brian
Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the
Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 251, 251 (2002).
18
Professor Allen suggests another possible motivation that “no matter how well
credentialed and conversant in an established field, an expert may still testify to
falsehoods.” See Allen, supra note 11, at 5.
19
This is also emphasized in the Kumho Court’s conclusion that “the question
before the trial court was specific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether
this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist jurors ‘in deciding
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[T]he specific issue before the [district] court was not the
reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual and
tactile inspection, [but was instead] the reasonableness of using
such an approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the
particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly
20
relevant.

Various federal courts have read Kumho to require evaluation of the
application of the science, technology, or specialized knowledge to the
21
specific facts at issue and this shift in emphasis was also reflected in
the December 2000 amendments to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
22
Evidence.
If scientific, technological, and specialized evidence is likely to
be admitted or excluded based upon the court’s evaluation of how
the particular issues in the case.’” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted). According to Professor Risinger who has also advanced the idea of a new
focus on the “task at hand,”
what is clearly not consistent with Kumho Tire is any attempt to
approach the issue of reliability globally. That is, reliability cannot be
judges globally, “as drafted,” but only specifically, “as applied.” The
emphasis on the judgment of reliability as it applies to the individual
case, to the “task at hand,” runs through the opinion like a river.
D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand:” Non-Science Forensic Science After
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 767, 773 (2000).
20
Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153.
21
See, e.g., Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l., Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“Whether Daubert’s suggested indicia of reliability apply to any given testimony
depends on the nature of the issue at hand, the witness’s particular expertise, and
the subject of the testimony. It is a fact-specific inquiry.”) (internal citation omitted);
United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 315 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Kumho
Court engaged in a thorough reexamination of the technology relevant to the facts
that had been presented to the district court); United States v. Brumley, 217 F.3d
905, 911 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that “[t]he Supreme Court in Kumho Tire explained
that the Daubert ‘gatekeeper’ factors had to be adjusted to fit the facts of the particular
case at issue, with the goal of testing the reliability of the expert opinion”) (emphasis
added); United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 554 (D. Md. 2002) (“[J]udges do
not determine the reliability of scientific or technical issues in the abstract but rather
in the context of deciding a particular dispute.”).
22
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to include the following (shown in
italics):
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702. The amended Rule 702 has also been interpreted to require a
relevance-based focus. See, e.g., Cloud v. Pfizer Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (D.
Ariz. 2001) (“[F]ederal judges must exclude proffered scientific evidence under Rule
702 unless they are convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dispute
in the case . . . .”).
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well an expert can apply her knowledge and methods to a discrete set
of facts, the advantages and disadvantages of this more case-specific
approach must be explored.
A. Local Advantages, Global Problems
I have previously described some of the advantages of a more
23
fact-specific admissibility inquiry.
At the local or individual case
level, limiting the scope of the pretrial evaluation to those principles
and methods actually applied by this expert to a given set of facts has
at least two advantages. By limiting the scope of the analysis, this
inquiry conforms more realistically to most judges’ limited
understanding of complex scientific, technical or other highly
specialized information. It also serves the omnipresent judicial
concerns of timeliness and efficiency. Upon further reflection, and
in light of more recent empirical data, the global or systemic
disadvantages of a fact-intensive validity assessment have become
more apparent.
Recent empirical data demonstrate that an overwhelming
number of judges do not comprehend the basic scientific principles
that underlie the Daubert decision. This study concludes that two of
the four Daubert factors, testability/falsifiability and error rates, are
24
uniformly misunderstood and misapplied. Although this same study
finds that most judges accurately comprehend and apply the only
other Daubert criterion added to the Frye standard, i.e., peer review
and publication, facility with this remaining factor provides cold
comfort in light of even more recent biomedical data.
Last year the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
(“JAMA”), dedicated an entire issue to reporting on extensive recent
empirical data that cast grave doubts on the general assumption,
adopted wholeheartedly by the Daubert Court, that peer review
25
actually enhances the validity of scientific publications.
The
problem with courts using peer review and publication to assess the
validity of scientific evidence lies not with judges (who can
understand and operate this criterion), but with the scientists
themselves. The JAMA data expose hidden impediments that may
hinder gate keeping efforts by even the most scientifically
sophisticated and conscientious members of the judiciary.
In addition to these troubling new data, we must consider the
global or systemic effects of a judicial and legislative movement
23
24
25

See generally Moreno, supra note 5.
See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 439.
See generally 287 JAMA 2739-2898 (June 5, 2002) [hereinafter JAMA].
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towards a more fact-based qualitative assessment of scientific
evidence. Case-specific evaluation of science “as applied” runs afoul
of bedrock scientific principles, conflicts with widely-accepted
methods of gauging validity, and guarantees that we cannot develop
consistent or useful precedent.
The danger is that judges who lack scientific facility and perceive
their role as limited to an assessment of the science applied by this
expert in this case may be less rigorous in their evaluation. This can
be particularly problematic if judges mistakenly assume that an
imprimatur of validity from within the discipline itself provides some
sort of guarantee. Under these circumstances, it is hard to have faith
that over the past decade the Daubert admissibility standard has been
accurately understood or consistently applied.
II. HIDDEN DANGERS: JUDGES’ PROBLEMS UNDERSTANDING AND
APPLYING THE DAUBERT CRITERIA OF TESTIFIABILITY/FALSIFIABILITY
AND ERROR RATES
A recent study of four hundred judges demonstrates that the vast
majority of state court judges cannot comprehend or implement even
26
the most basic scientific concepts. The Gatowski study was designed
to “assess the level at which the judiciary understand the scientific
meaning of the Daubert guidelines and how they might apply them
27
when evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence.” It provided
information that had never previously been collected, analyzed, or
28
published and researchers used a different methodology for data
collection.
They questioned judges directly, rather than the
previously favored method of relying on a retrospective analyses of
29
published judicial opinions.
While providing important insight regarding the influence of
Daubert, an empirical analysis of published case law is, by its very
nature, restricted to an analysis of post hoc justifications of those
writing a decision in a particular case and does not fully capture
the judicial decision-making process. Although an empirical
analysis of case law provides important data about judges’
normative, case specific reasoning, research has demonstrated
that there may be significant differences between published and
unpublished cases, and that these differences may be dependent
26

See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 439. This national survey involved judges
throughout the country in states that have adopted Daubert, states that have adopted
a modified version of Daubert, and states that continue to apply Frye. See id.
27
Id. at 438.
28
See id. at 433-35.
29
See id.
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upon the case characteristics analyzed and the legal questions
30
involved.

The Gatowski study concluded that Daubert is neither accurately
31
nor consistently applied. The overwhelming majority of judges have
32
no real understanding of two of the four Daubert criteria.
33
Specifically, while 88% of the judges reported that “falsifiability” is a
useful guideline for assessing scientific evidence, 96% of these same
judges lacked even a basic understanding of this core scientific
34
concept.
Similarly, 91% of the judges reported that they found
35
“error rates” helpful, although when questioned, they had no real
36
understanding of this basic scientific precept.
These findings lead the researchers to conclude that “judges
have difficulty operationalizing the Daubert criteria and applying
30

Id.
See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 443. Other commentators have noted that
the Gatowski study substantiated existing “uncertainty about whether judges, despite
their best intentions, have the time or training to carry out their gatekeeper
responsibilities effectively.” Dixon & Gill, supra note 17, at 245.
32
See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 444-46.
33
Nine years ago, the Daubert Court concluded that falsifiability was “a key
question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact,” and defined falsifiability as “whether it
[the theory] can be (and has been) tested.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. In a law review
article by Professor Mark Green, quoted by the Supreme Court in Daubert,
falsifiability is further defined as the theory that “knowledge is gained by attempting
to disprove or falsify a hypothesis based on empirical investigation. Scientific
methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they
can be falsified. Indeed, this methodology is what distinguished science from other
fields of human inquiry.” See id. at 586 n.4 (citing Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses
and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and
Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)).
34
See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 444-45. This means that judges could not
articulate the assumptions underlying Daubert (1) that scientific hypotheses are not
proved through testing; (2) that testing is aimed at refuting a hypothesis; (3) that
hypotheses that are not refutable/falsifiable are by definition not scientific; and (4)
that only hypotheses that are not falsified, but could be, provide the basis for reliable
scientific theories.
35
The Daubert Court cautioned that “in the case of a particular scientific
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error
and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s
operation.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (internal citations omitted). When error rates
are used to assess the validity of a scientific methodology, they can include false
negative errors (when an experimenter misses a real effect), false positive errors
(when an experimenter perceives an effect that did not occur), and sampling errors
(when an experimenter extrapolates from a small sample to a large population). See
KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND
THE FEDERAL COURTS 75-76 (1999) (defining false positive and false negative errors
and describing how they can result in sampling error).
36
See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 445.
31
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them, especially with respect to falsifiability and error rate.” The
researchers also noted that despite specific efforts by interviewers
aimed at allowing judges to express their level of comprehension
using their own words, “it seems likely that the ambiguity of the
[judges’] responses may reflect a genuine lack of understanding of
38
these scientific concepts.” It is not surprising that the study found
that judges scored much higher in their basic comprehension of the
last two Daubert criteria: peer review and publication (71%) and the
39
Frye criterion of general acceptance (82%). However, even more
recent scientific data demonstrate that judicial comfort and
familiarity with some of the Daubert factors may do little to ensure that
only valid science enters the courts.
III. FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS: PEER REVIEW MAY NOT ENHANCE THE
VALIDITY OF SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS
Of the two remaining Daubert criteria, only the requirement that
judges assess “peer review and publication” adds any teeth to the old
Frye inquiry. However, this Daubert factor has been dormant for a
decade, virtually ignored by courts and commentators.
The Daubert Court clearly intended that judges use their own
evaluation of peer review and publication as a tool for exploring
whether substantive flaws in an expert’s methodology have been or
40
could have been exposed. This reading of Daubert makes sense for
three reasons. First, it is logically consistent with the Court’s
overarching concern that judges play a more active and autonomous
role in the evaluation of scientific validity. Second, it fits with the
Court’s desire to require judges to assess falsifiability, because judges
would be forced to examine peer review and publication in some
detail as part of an effort to determine whether a theory is capable of
being tested. Third, it is consistent with the Court’s concern about
error rates because it shares the same goal of exposing
methodological flaws. If Daubert were read this way, judges would
need to look critically at the standards and procedures of any peer
review proffered by the expert and evaluate the substance of all
published work. It may be no surprise that this is not what has
happened. Instead peer review and publication has become a
37

Id. at 452.
Id.
39
See id. at 447-48.
40
According to the Daubert Court, judges must evaluate peer review and
publication because “submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a
component of good science because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws
in the methodology will be detected.”
38
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virtually meaningless Frye-type surrogate for real review with the mere
fact of peer review, publication, or peer reviewed publication serving
41
as a validity enhancer.
This is problematic at both a local and global level. If the fact
that a theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and has
been published tells us anything useful about its validity, it tells us
only something vague and general. The mere fact of peer review
and/or publication inevitably tells us nothing about (1) the nature or
quality of the peer review process; (2) the effect of peer review on the
validity of the methods or conclusions contained in the published
work; or (3) whether the validity of the published methods or
conclusions is impacted by the manner in which this expert proposes
to use the theory or technique to make inferences or draw
conclusions in this case.
In a series of very recent studies published in the June 5, 2002
issue of JAMA, scientists themselves question whether peer review has
any positive effect on the quality of medical articles that appear in
42
even the most prestigious scientific publications. Here are just a few
examples of the conclusions drawn from the many empirical studies
assessing the actual value of peer review.
• That an examination of articles before and after they had
been subjected to peer review reveals that “true effects
[of peer review] have not been determined . . . [and] the
term peer review is used to describe a number of
different processes . . . [so] it may not always be possible
to make a clear distinction between peer review and
43
technical editing.”
• That a study of methodological problems in published
reports of randomized controlled trials (“RCTs”) reveals
that “there is considerable evidence that many published
reports of RCTs are poor or even wrong, despite their
41

A recent Lexis search revealed that 92 post-Kumho federal appellate court cases
mentioned the phrase “peer review and publication.” Eighty-six of these cases were
mere recitations of the Daubert factors. A recent study assessing the effect of Daubert
in criminal cases found that appellate court opinions which devoted an average of
1,162 words to a discussion of expert evidence, devoted only an average of 15 words
to the peer review and publication criterion. Ironically, cases decided before Daubert
devoted an average of 21 words to peer review and publication while cases decided
after Daubert devoted only an average of five words, just one more than repeating the
criterion requires. Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility
of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 339,
350 (2002).
42
See JAMA, supra note 26.
43
Tom Jefferson et al., Measuring the Quality of Editorial Peer Review, in JAMA, supra
note 26, at 2787.
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clear importance.”
• That a cross-sectional study of 243 original research
articles published in a variety of scientific journals reveals
that “many published reports are of poor-to-average
45
methodological quality.”
• That “[a]lthough there is considerable evidence that
methodological errors are common in articles in medical
journals, much published research does not have
46
substantive contribution from a statistician.”
• That a study of the methodological quality of 60
published reports of RCTs reveals that “[t]he validity of .
. . results is threatened by the subversion of
randomization, resulting in biased allocation to
comparison groups, the unequal provision of care apart
from the intervention under evaluation, the biased
assessment of outcomes, and the inadequate handling of
47
dropouts and losses to follow-up.”
In a summary editorial, Dr. Drummond Rennie explained that these
data reflect a sixteen-year long coordinated international effort to
48
research the effects of peer review.
According to Dr. Rennie,
despite a concerted effort to study and improve the process, “we find
ourselves in the peculiar position of believing still more in the virtues
of peer review, a system we know to be time-consuming, complex,
expensive, and prone to abuse, while we acknowledge that the
49
scientific evidence for its value is meager.”
The implications of this new empirical evidence are profound.
As the world grows more scientifically complex, many judges seem to
lack even basic familiarity with the scientific process and scientists
themselves have dubious faith in their own quality-control
mechanisms. Daubert, Kumho, and the modifications to Rule 702
reflect a coordinated judicial and legislative effort to construct an
analytic tool enabling lay judges (and then in turn lay jurors) to
discriminate between good and bad science. This task, which is
44

Douglas G. Altman, Poor-Quality Medical Research: What Can Journals Do?, in
JAMA, supra note 26, at 2765.
45
Kirby P. Lee et al., Association of Journal Quality Indicators With Methodological
Quality of Clinical Research Articles, in JAMA supra note 26, at 2805.
46
Douglas G. Altman et al., How Statistical Expertise is Used in Medical Research, in
JAMA supra note 26, at 2817.
47
Karin Huwiler-Müntener et al., Quality of Reporting of Randomized Trials as a
Measure of Methodologic Quality, in JAMA supra note 26, at 2801.
48
See Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Fourth International Congress on Peer Review in
Biomedical Publication, in JAMA, supra note 26, at 2759-60.
49
Id. (quotation omitted).
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difficult enough, is exacerbated when judges are hampered by their
lack of scientific sophistication and are forced to acknowledge that
even published, peer-reviewed studies may contain serious
50
undisclosed methodological flaws.
IV. HOW CAN WE USE THIS INFORMATION?
The question then becomes what impact should these data have
on how we frame the admissibility inquiry? Although we should
recognize that peer review and publication do not guarantee
scientific validity, these quality control mechanisms are not entirely
without value. Presumably, scientific journals reject a great deal of
bad science. In general, they seek to publish experiments that are
described in sufficient detail so that their results may be replicated.
Consider the alternative. In a sense the internet is the most pervasive
example of unlimited access to information without centralized
oversight or control. A quick search of what appear to be medical
websites provides “data” to support the following scientific claims: (1)
vitamins make people energetic; (2) special diets cure cancer; (3)
acupuncture can cure a variety of diseases; and (4) childhood
51
immunizations cause autism. Although imperfect, prepublication
52
peer review maintains minimum standards of honesty and accuracy.
Given the fact that courts cannot abandon or improve the peer
review and publication process, the best that judges can do is be more
self-conscious about how they understand and use this evidence as
part of the validity calculus and recognize that, as a tool, it has
unfulfilled potential.
50

In another recent empirical study of the effect of Daubert on civil cases,
researchers concluded that “since Daubert, judges have examined the reliability of
expert evidence more closely and have found more evidence unreliable as a result.
Our analysis, however, does not allow us to conclude whether this increased scrutiny
resulted in better outcomes.” Dixon & Gill, supra note 17, at 269. “Judges may feel
compelled to evaluate reliability and yet not be knowledgeable enough in the
relevant field to make accurate determinations.” Id at 301.
51
For an extensive, regularly updated, and well-organized list of misleading
medical and scientific websites, see www.quackwatch.com.
52
It is scientifically inaccurate and legally unnecessary to describe scientific
theories as valid or invalid. Theories involving science are never wholly accurate or
wholly inaccurate explanations of the empirical world. Scientific validity is better
understood as a matter of degree rather than in absolute terms. This means that
“‘[v]alidity’ in science is not a binary attribute, like pregnancy.” FOSTER & HUBER,
supra note 37, at 17 (discussing issues of scientific uncertainty and the limited ability
of scientists to speak in terms of absolutes). This fits with the legal burden in cases
involving scientific evidence, which is that “the proponent of the testimony does not
have the burden of proving that it is scientifically correct, but that by a
preponderance of the evidence, it is reliable . . . .” Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp.,
184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).
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V. THE INHERENT FALLACY OF FACT-BASED VALIDITY
Finally, at the global or systemic level, we should recognize that
judicial decisions that turn on whether a particular scientific theory
or methodology has been reliably applied to a given set of facts, are
scientifically meaningless. A legal decision that is grounded in factspecific validity (e.g., a conclusion based on the specific scientific
data relied upon by this expert to reliably explain these facts) is the
antithesis of science. Science, in all of its disciplines, is cumulative
53
and based on a continuing aggregation of new data.
In fact,
scientific thought is premised on the assumption that conclusions are
valid only if they “can be generalized to settings and subjects outside
54
those described in the study.”
Case-specific determinations of the validity of a particular
application of a scientific theory or method also undermine our goals
by ensuring that little reliable or predictive precedent will be created
to assist judges who must decide the admissibility of complex or
disputed theories and techniques. We do not want to end up where
each court is engaged in a historically isolated fact-based analysis that
will not perform the precedential function of controlling the quality
of the science and technology that enters our courtrooms.
VI. CONCLUSION
The fact that judges need to evaluate scientific evidence does not
make it easy. This is especially true in areas of complex or developing
knowledge where the experts themselves are most likely to disagree.
The danger is that judges who lack scientific facility and perceive
their role as limited to an assessment of the science applied by this
expert in this case may be less rigorous in their evaluation. As the
new studies reveal, judges may also be inclined to favor evaluative
criteria that are easier for them to comprehend, regardless of their
inherent ability to ferret out problems that should detract from the
validity of the expert’s opinions and conclusions. Finally, we must
acknowledge that case-specific evaluations of science “as applied”
run afoul of bedrock scientific principles and widely-accepted
53

See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 37, at 17.
See id. at 146. Professor Allen makes a related observation when he states,
“expert testimony cannot advance accurate outcomes locally unless it rests on
acceptable epistemological warrant globally. A necessary but not sufficient condition
of appropriate testimony ‘locally’ is reliable expertise ‘globally.’” Allen, supra note 11,
at 6. Similarly, Professor Allen notes “[w]ithout global reliability, one has gibberish.
Thus, the logical relationships underlying the Supreme Court’s cases require that
both the global and local issues be resolved favorably before an expert should be
allowed to testify.” Id.
54
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methods of gauging validity. As Justice Rehnquist foretold in his
Daubert dissent, “I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges;
but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the
scientific status of a theory depends on its ‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect
55
some of them will be, too.”
Apparently, Justice Rehnquist had
reason for concern.

55

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

